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Abstract: China and Vietnam have achieved tremendous economic 
growth in the past decades. The successful development despite their 
weak formal institutions has deeply challenged conventional 
economic theories and has demonstrated an undervaluation of 
informal institutions. In this study, the emerging private sector that 
has vastly contributed to the rise of China and Vietnam is analyzed 
based on theories within the study fields of New Institutional 
Economics and Economic Sociology. 
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1. Introduction   
The rise of China’s economy has astonished the international community. It has become one 
of the most controversially discussed and researched topics, making world-famous economists 
and Nobel-prize winners questioning commonly accepted fundamental principles of economic 
development. Additionally, the world is as well keeping a close eye on other rapidly 
developing countries, inter alia, Vietnam, who has often been referred to as China’s little 
brother, seemingly following a similar development strategy with considerable success. While 
OECD countries such as the U.S., many European countries, and Japan have entered a period 
of economic difficulties, coping with major issues such as rising youth unemployment, 
growing wealth gap and other issues, the two Asian countries were among the few rising 
economies, showing average GDP growth rates of 10.9 percent in China and 7.06 percent in 
Vietnam between 2005 and 2010 (CSY, 2011). Other accomplishments were the reduction of 
poverty, and gaining importance within the international market. Particularly China has been 
attributed to stabilize the global market. 
The research problem deals with the importance of the emerging private sector in China and 
Vietnam whose development and success cannot be fully explained by conventional theories 
of New Institutional Economics (NIE). The purpose of this paper is therefore to analyze the 
private sector development of China and Vietnam by utilizing a theoretical framework that is 
based on New Institutional Economics but extended by subfields of Economic Sociology. In 
this sense, there is an empirical research question as well as a theoretical research question 
that are closely intertwined. 
1.) How did the private sector in China and Vietnam grow despite the institutional 
weaknesses? 
2.) To what extent can the study fields of New Institutional Economics and Economic 
Sociology explain the private sector development? 
The methodology used to answer those research questions consist mainly of literature-based 
research, while an own case study has been added. Analyses and comparison based on 
quantitative methods or official statistics are avoided due to the unreliability of data 
concerning this specific subject. However, the chosen methodology contains weaknesses and 
limitations. For instance, the country-specific literature and research makes generalizations 
extremely difficult. Also, theories that are formulated based on the findings are rather vague 
and cannot be supported by empirical evidence. Furthermore, a fraction of the previous 
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research as well as the case study are based on subjective survey data, which is typically 
associated with a variety of difficulties. For instance, the subjective perception does not 
always reflect reality. Moreover, truthful answers are not guaranteed, either because of 
misunderstanding or lack of willingness to provide them. Therefore, all the results and 
findings will be carefully and cautiously interpreted, while keeping these limitations in mind. 
The paper is divided into three main sections. At first, an introduction into the study field of 
New Institutional Economics is given, describing, analyzing, and contrasting the most 
prominent representatives and their perspectives. NIE is still considered to be in an infant 
stage, plus informal institutions have typically only been briefly mentioned. This indicates 
that at it plays a marginal role. Hence, another field of studies will be introduced, namely 
Economic Sociology. The rationality behind this is that informal institutions such as informal 
networking, norms and behaviour, are in essence a part of social science, which many 
economists have failed to incorporate in their models. Following the theoretical framework, 
an overview of China and Vietnam is given regarding their initial conditions, development 
strategies, the role of the state, and important policies. These factors will give an overview 
about the formal institutions that influence economic activities and will as well underline the 
limits of NIE. Therefore, one particular sector is picked out to exemplify the power of 
informal institutions, namely the private sector. A detailed analysis of this sector will provide 
a greater understanding of informal institutions and therefore help to further expand the field 
of NIE, suggesting the incorporation of social science subfields such as Economic sociology 
and recommend models, theories, and policy recommendation based on cross-disciplinary 
studies. This paper is in essence a literature based study that has been extended by a small, 
self-conducted survey.  
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. New Institutional Economics 
The late 70s marked the revival of Institutionalism, modified by including game-theoretic 
approached, referred to as New Institutional Economics. New Institutional Economics is a 
fairly recent and still evolving field of study. It is an umbrella term for economists that 
emphasize the importance of institutions in determining an economy’s success or failure 
(North, 1994, Williamson, 2000, Angeles, 2011). Various difficulties arise with this subject. 
Variation and disagreement exist among authors regarding the definition of institutions, the 
nature of institutions, meaning how they develop, persist, and change, as well as about the 
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relationship between institutions and economic development. In the following, the perspective 
of prominent institutional economists is presented, while contrasting their emphasis on 
different aspects. According to North (1990, p.3-4) institutions are humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interactions, thus providing incentive structure. They can be of 
formal or informal nature, as well as be created or evolving and the main purpose is to reduce 
uncertainty. This is a commonly shares perspective. Harris, Hunter, and Lewis (1995, p. 25) 
highlight the interdependent nature of formal and informal rules, and state that the mixture of 
those two as well as the enforcement ultimately determine economic performance. Despite 
many disagreements about specific aspects of institutions, it has been regarded as a highly 
significant study field. The hope is that it will facilitate developing alternative policy 
recommendations that are based on a more realistic view of economic development than the 
prevailing neo-classical theory (Harris, Hunter, Lewis, 199, p. 3, 7).  
Development, change, and stability of institutions 
When it comes to the questions how institutions are developed and established, there are two 
extreme viewpoints suggested by Hardin (1982: 2). One perspective regards institutions as the 
result of deliberate action, typically induced by the government, also called top-down 
approach. This would include policies, laws, and reforms introduced by a higher authority 
such as the state. In this case, formal rules are introduced and enforced by a third party, 
meaning that institutional change occurs quite rapidly (North 1990: 6). This view puts a 
higher authority such as the state and lower government bodies into the centre of interest since 
they are the main decision-makers. In contrast, institutions can also be considered as an 
evolutionary process, developing rather spontaneously, corresponding to the changing 
informal rules among individuals. In this case, there is no formal agreement about the ongoing 
rules, but they are commonly accepted since they reflect people’s own values. Additionally, 
these slowly developing institutions are attributed to be self-enforcing and thus more stable 
since their effectiveness is based on game-theoretic concepts. Instead of the state, individual 
economic actors and organizations are in focus, meaning that private entrepreneurs and 
informal business networks are the key drivers. In Hayek (1973, p.5) has named these two 
extreme views made order and evolutionary rationalism. North (1990, p.6) adds that 
institutions usually evolve incrementally.  
The evolutionary nature of institutions has been found to be considerably effective despite the 
lack of an independent third party and clearly-cut out rules. The reason for this is that those 
institutions have become self-enforcing by being internalized in people’s mind. Their 
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behaviour is therefore guided by commonly accepted informal mechanism within their 
community such as social sanctions in case of rule violation (Furubotn, Richter 2011, p. 288). 
 Based on this theory, the agent of change in the economic sense is therefore the individual 
entrepreneurs, interacting within an institutional framework, while at the same time exerting 
influencing on existing institutions, possibly leading to change and alteration in the long-run 
(North 1990, p. 83). Neither the top-down approach nor the bottom-up development of 
institutions are an easy process, both carry its own difficulties. At first sight, the top-down 
induced institutions appear more straightforward and uncomplicated since the institution is 
directly created and technically effective immediately.  
Besides the issue with this new institution being accepted by the broad masses and 
internalized in their behaviour, one major problem for the authority, often the state, is the 
introduction of the right institution at the right time (Chang, Rowthorn 1995, p.39). Many 
international organizations such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) have based their policy recommendations on neo-classical theories that advocate 
the idea of free market mechanism with as little state intervention as possible. The rise of 
economies under authoritarian regimes, combined with the rather disappointing development 
of newly democratic countries has shed a new light on the significance of state involvement, 
showing that economists will have to take into account the complex role of the government 
(Nolan 1995, p.239) 
Timing and the right institutions 
A vast number of prominent institutional economists have emphasized the significance of 
effective property rights in inducing growth. According to North (1990, p.81), competition, 
decentralized decision-making, effective property rights, and bankruptcy laws belong to the 
most important institutions since they not only encourage and reward high performance and 
successful efforts, but also suspend unsuccessful efforts. Particularly, the role of well-
specified property rights has been underlined by a variety of academics (Angeles 2011). 
Despite the strong focus on formal institutions, informal institutions have been commonly 
acknowledged as playing an important role as well. The theory of mental models argues that 
idea and ideologies are crucial since they determine the way individuals interpret their 
institutional environment (North 1990, p.111, Harris, Hunter, Lewis 1995, p. 25). For 
instance, the government may introduce a new law, but if society generally has absolutely no 
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trust in the enforcement of laws, they will make their economic choices as if the law does not 
exist, making the government’s effort completely ineffective.  
This aspects is of particular importance in developing and transition economies where general 
mistrust in laws persist among people, making most top-down decisions regarding 
institutional change unsuccessful. This realization suggests that institutional change must 
begin within people’s mind. When discussing about the most important institutions, 
disagreement also exists about whether formal and informal institutions should be regarded as 
complementary. According to Williamson (1996), informal institutions may play a major role 
in developing and transition economies, but as the process of economic development becomes 
more sophisticated and complex, more effective formal institutions will be established, 
making the formerly necessary informal institutions redundant. The opposite view would be 
that the importance of informal institutions will not diminish with the introduction of effective 
formal institutions (Johnson, McMillan, Woodruff 2002). 
Summary  
In summary, NIE theories offer a valuable basis in understanding the role of institutions in 
shaping economic outcomes. In essence, institutions are considered to be the key determinant 
of an economy’s development. Main issues derive from the theoretical inconsistency among 
institutional economists as well as the difficulty in conducting empirical research (Harris, 
Hunter, Lewis 1995, p.7). Nonetheless, NIE aids in gaining insights into a major source of 
economic growth. Effective property rights, rule of law, and other market-supporting 
institutions certainly play an important function by reducing uncertainty within business 
environments. Although these formal institutions are of high significance, especially for the 
long-term economic performance, they are extremely difficult to establish in a transition 
economy and accepted among the ruling political party members, not to mention among 
society. However, the dominant literature has vastly neglected the importance of informal 
institutions, a significant part that requires more detailed research. This may lead to 
inadequate policy recommendations since informal institutions play a significant role in 
shaping economic behaviour, particularly in developing and transitioning economies. For this 
reason, another field of studies will be introduced that will help understanding the mechanism 
of informal institutions. 
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2.2. Economic sociology 
Economic Sociology deals with the sociological perspective applied to economic occurrences. 
This includes personal relations, group formation, social control mechanisms, and most 
recently, the study of social networks under consideration of the cultural environment 
(Smelser, Swedberg 2005, p.3). Many attempts have been made to incorporate the subject of 
social relations into the study of economic behavior (Smelser, Swedberg 2005, p.49. Bounded 
rationality is an important concept within economics, but orthodox economists habitually 
neglect the influence of culture and norms on an individuals’ decision-making, a mistake that 
can be solve by following a sociological approach.  
In the following, three essential components will be introduced, utilizing elements of 
economic sociology to explain growth-enhancing economic phenomenon in virtually 
complete absence of formal institutions. These components are highly intertwined and are 
regarded as potential key drivers of an economy. The first factor is the private entrepreneur as 
an individual agent and social actor who has the potential to exert enormous influence on the 
institutional framework of the economic sphere. The second main aspect deals with social 
networking as a tool to combine and extent the power of those entrepreneurs, enabling 
business transactions with minimum risks. Finally, localized industrial cluster that can result 
from organized networking activities and may significantly contributed to economic growth 
are examined in terms of development, significance, and limitations. Informal institutions 
serve as a viable substitute to formal institutions in dealing with common problems that 
entrepreneurs face in an uncertain business environment. The subfields in focus will form a 
framework that serves as an analytic tool to understand the private sector in China and 
Vietnam. 
General 
Social embeddedness is a crucial constituent that has been specifically accentuated by 
Granovetter, referring to the high influence of existing social relations on rationally acting 
individuals. The focus lies on informal solutions in dealing with trust issues within a business 
environment (Nee 2005, p.53). This approach seems more appealing in explaining business 
practices in transition economies that are typically characterized by flawed legal system, thus 
increasing the significance of informal mechanisms. 
Entrepreneurship  
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The role of entrepreneurship will be one of the key aspects of this study paper. Since the mid-
20
th
 entrepreneurship has gained the attention of economists’ community, triggered by the 
work of Schumpeter in 1934 who has defined entrepreneurs as a key driver of economic 
growth (Vuong, Tran 2009). Important to note is that the role of entrepreneurs have to be 
examined in the country-specific cases, meaning that the institutional environment has to be 
taken into account. In order to later inspect the function, power, and limitations of 
entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam, entrepreneurship has to be studied within a particular 
economic, political, and cultural environment. This environment is characterized by enormous 
obstacles for private entrepreneurs, especially in pre-reform period. Due to the socialist 
heritage, private businessmen have struggled with negative associations, since they 
represented bourgeois values and capitalism, exactly contradicting to the communist ideas 
that dominated the countries at that time. For this reason, private entrepreneurial activities 
were mostly conducted semi-illegally and took place within the informal sector, meaning that 
hardly any accurate data sets exist about these movements.  
Generally, entrepreneurship is a valuable source of economic growth, providing dynamism 
and competition, innovation, new technology, creating business opportunities, and 
employment opportunities, regardless of the country’s development stage (Lu 1994, p.3, 
Aldrich, Ruef 2006, p.460). One of the most interesting aspects about entrepreneurship is that 
they can either reproduce or challenge existing orders (Aldrich, Ruef 2006, p.451). Starting a 
business is always associated with risk, which is even accelerated in a suppressed market that 
exists in most socialist authoritarian regimes. Due to the fact that entrepreneurs face serious 
obstacles in terms of socio-political legitimacy they have to find ways of operating within a 
hostile system. Eventually, their efforts can affect their surrounding environment and possibly 
alter the polity and cultural norms in their favor (Aldrich, Ruef 2006, p.468). 
Even when authoritarian leaders take the decision to follow a pro-market approach by 
legitimizing private entrepreneurial activities, the transition towards a sophisticated market is 
a lengthy process, leaving entrepreneurs in transition periods with a highly unstable 
environment filled with uncertainty. In order to survive, private entrepreneurs must therefore 
become creative in dealing with every-day business issues. But the importance of 
entrepreneurs in former-socialist countries goes beyond transforming the economic sphere. 
Entrepreneurial activities have been attributed to indirectly pioneer political reforms (Lu 
1994, p. 53). This viewpoint can be easily understood if the top-down and bottom-up 
approach are regarded as mutually influencing forces. Assuming that the state is a benevolent 
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leader, successful entrepreneurial activities that contribute to the overall economy will 
eventually be legitimized and promoted, even if the activities oppose the ruling party’s 
ideology. Researchers have found reforms regarding the private sector to be the result of 
interaction between pragmatic leaders within the ruling party and private innovative activities 
(Lu 1994, p.107). The growing number of journal articles and conference about 
entrepreneurship and the rapid growth of business schools in the 1990s suggest that it has 
reached a phase in which it has been conceptualized as an academic field (Aldrich, Ruef 2006, 
p.470). 
Social networking 
Social networking is a valuable practice because linking individual together in an informal 
network or affiliation provides a form of social order. Simultaneously, this order gives an 
incentive structure, including new opportunities and constraints that are commonly accepted 
by the actors (Smith-Doerr 2005, p.377). Trust is a key factor when dealing with business 
partners, especially in an institutional environment in which basic rights will not be protected 
by formal laws. Furthermore, trust is more easily established between people who are similar 
or alike. This gives an explanation why business networks based on trust are easier to 
establish in homogenous countries since people instinctively bond better with other of their 
own ethnicity (Aldrich, Ruef 2006, p.459). Following this logic, countries with a 
heterogeneous population, for instance Malaysia and Indonesia with a large number of ethnic 
Chinese will struggle to develop inter-ethnical business networks. The leaders of those 
countries must therefore firstly ensure a harmonious relationship between different ethnic 
groups.  
The concept of Guanxi or Giao Luu is not unique to China and Vietnam. Establishing and 
maintaining personal connections with the purpose of benefiting your future business is 
common practice in all countries, including highly developed economies. Nonetheless, the 
extent to which it influences the business performance differs. Other than serving as an 
alternative to relying on formal institutions, the power of personal networking is also 
accelerated due to the respective culture. One of the most interesting aspects in social 
networking is that close-knit relationship between businessmen can substitute for the lack of 
effective laws and regulations to a certain extent. The court system is thus replaced by social 
mechanisms that can be divided into rewarding mechanism such as high reputation and status 
among the business community, and sanctioning mechanisms such as gossip (Granovetter 
1985). These mechanisms are particularly powerful when the business community is 
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localized, meaning that it is easy to acquire information about other members and when 
finding a new business partner is rather difficult. In this case, the success of a firm highly 
depends on its reputation that is ultimately determined by fellow businessmen and customers. 
As a consequence, fair cooperation is in the interest of rationally acting individuals and thus 
crucial for success. 
Regional clusters 
Organized social networks can take form of a very particular type, namely regional clusters. 
This phenomenon has caught the attention of economists since the emergence of famous and 
highly successful regional districts such as Silicon Valley in California (Furubotn, Richter 
2011, p. 309). Porter (1998, p.273) argues that industrial clusters are the origins of an 
economy’s competitive advantage. Cluster theory is integrated into the overall theoretical 
framework since it forms the basis of the private sector growth in China and Vietnam. One of 
the most prominent researches regarding regional cluster has been conducted on Silicon 
Valley, the prime example for a successful cluster. According to Saxenian (1994, p. 166), the 
strength in industrial districts lies in the opportunity for collective learning, information, 
resource, and technology sharing between specialists through informal communication 
channels which significantly quickens the process. Furthermore, the density of the network of 
like-minded people creates an atmosphere that encourages mutual collaboration, ultimately 
leading to innovative activities (Smith-Doerr, Powell 2005, p. 387).  
The close geographical and spatial proximity therefore brings many advantages. It allows 
specialization on a certain products or service. Industrial clusters are therefore regarded as 
self-enforcing institutions. A company’s success highly depends on the achievements’ of 
other firms since they share many resources and their products often complement each other. 
Moreover, they typically hold ongoing business relations, meaning that the repetitive 
contracting most likely leads to social relationships that promote reciprocating behaviour. In 
summary, due to the spatial proximity, governance is carried out based on general trust which 
makes the system reasonably stable. Otsuka and Sonobe (n.a.) have studied industrial clusters 
in East Asia and developed an endogenous model of cluster-based industrial development that 
distinguishes between three phases: the initiation phase, the quantity expansion phase through 
imitation activities, and finally the quality improvement phase through innovation and 
technology upgrading. The last phase is the most problematic one since there are 
contradictory theories and cases regarding the way to achieve it. This typically splits the 
academic community in opposing sides. On the one side there are advocates of technological 
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leapfrogging through integration into a global value chain and moving up the technological 
ladder through foreign direct investment (FDI) and joint ventures. On the other side, the 
development of strong domestic capacities is highly emphasized through investment into 
R&D and education, meaning that the dependency on foreign countries is reduced.  
Concluding remarks 
Ideally, the formal and informal rules of the game are aligned in a manner that there is no 
conflict of interests. However, this ideal case is quite rare. Especially in a country that is 
undergoing a major transformation, the speed of change differs significantly. For this reason, 
formal rules laid out by the government are often inconsistent with the informal rules that in 
reality guide the behaviour of important actors. This misalignment will most likely lead to 
noncompliance or oppositional behaviour on the side of economic actors. This can take form 
of discretely circumventing the official rules up until actively resisting against them, also 
referred to as decoupling from norms (Nee 2005, p.59). As soon as the process of decoupling 
starts and gains power through rising number of participation, the reaction of the government 
is extremely important for the subsequent development path, most likely determining 
economic success or failure in the long-run.   
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3. Institutional Analysis of China and Vietnam 
China and Vietnam have been chosen as the countries in focus for various reasons. First of all, 
they share many similarities in terms of history, culture, and development path. Both 
countries have a rather homogenous population, they have been traditionally influenced by 
socialist ideas and are still dominated by a communist party with virtually no political 
competition existing (King, Szelény 2005). Moreover, they have undergone devastating 
periods that have left the country economically stagnated and the people poor. The Great Leap 
Forward and Cultural Revolution in China, and the Vietnam War have tremendously 
traumatized the country. Furthermore, they have started with similar factor endowments. 
Although the countries heavily differ in size, at the beginning of reform both had a large 
surplus of cheap and unskilled labour. Also, there is common agreement that China and 
Vietnam have exceptional social indicators in terms of health and education in pre-reform 
period compared to other low-income countries (Harvie, Tran 1997, p. 16). In addition, the 
government has introduced a similar development strategy. They have started with 
modernizing the agricultural sector since the majority of the population worked in rural areas. 
Since the state has decided to address and reform a sector that affects a large part of the 
population they gained trustworthiness of the masses which strengthens their legitimacy. An 
important component of the state’s strategy is the gradual and incremental approach, initiating 
reforms step-wise and on an experimental basis. High economic growth and poverty reduction 
also went along with relatively equal distribution of wealth, indicated by a GINI coefficient of 
35.6 in Vietnam and 42.6 in China in the year 2008 (The World Bank 2014). Despite these 
similarities, Vietnam’s growth has been significantly below China’s (Vu 2009). An 
institutional analysis might provide a reason for this divergence. 
The second reason for choosing China and Vietnam is the fact that their cases strongly 
contradicts with conventional theory about the main determinants of economic growth. The 
theory of NIE is that institutions are crucial to a country’s development, while the literature 
mainly studies and emphasizes the importance of formal institutions such as property rights 
and the rule of law. An analysis of the economic growth in China and Vietnam will illustrate 
that although core principles of NIE are indeed valid, but this field of studies has vastly 
underestimated the importance of informal institutions. For this reason, subfields of Economic 
Sociology will be examined to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and mechanism of 
informal institutions and their interaction with economic development. This will help in 
formulating more efficient policy recommendation for developing countries that severely lack 
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formal institutions. To begin with, the formal institutions that have been emphasized by NIE 
are analyzed, consisting of the political and legal framework. 
3.1. Formal Institutions 
This sections deals with the formal institutions that have a strong influence on private firms. 
Key elements are the political and legal system. In China and Vietnam, the problematic aspect 
is that the de jure rules and de facto rules typically diverge to a large extent. For this reason, 
one must analyze policies, laws, and regulations with careful consideration. 
The Communist Party 
An analysis of economic phenomenon in China and Vietnam cannot be fully made unless the 
political sphere has been examined as well. Characterizing their form of government as a one-
party system ruled by communist leaders in an authoritarian style would be an 
oversimplification of the real politics. First of all, it is in fact a one-party system, meaning that 
that the communist party will technically remain in power indefinitely. Although party 
members were traditionally explicitly chosen based on their ideological conviction, this does 
not mean that the majority still holds on to the original communist ideas. On the contrary, the 
ideas within the parties have become more progressive for different reason.  
One decisive step in China was made by Deng Xiaoping who pushed for economic reforms 
that essentially stand in contrast with communist ideologies, leading the way for a more 
pragmatic approach towards leading the country. Furthermore, although political reforms 
were less visible, they in fact existed and are still advancing. For instance, the newly 
introduced seniority system and the introduction of merit-based entrance exams for 
bureaucrats brought many young professionals into powerful government positions that were 
better educated as well as more open to progressive ideas (Li 1998). This has led to a form of 
inner-party democracy, with conservative and progressive members constantly balancing each 
other out, which allow reforms with capitalistic tendencies despite the socialist legacies.  
According to Vuving (2006), the communist party in Vietnam is divided into two fractions of 
modernizers and traditionalists, essentially similar to the Chinese party. Regarding a direct 
comparison, several authors have argued that the Central Committee is more democratic as 
well as more powerful that its counterpart in China which they traced back to a high number 
of members with diverse backgrounds (Thayer 2009). China and Vietnam have undergone a 
tremendous transformation towards a market economy, while preserving socialism as the core 
character (Harvie, Tran 1997, p. 164). Although the ruling political party maintains 
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tremendous power over economic activities, political decentralization has taken place. In 
China, this decentralization system has led to a type of federalist system, in which central 
government’s influence is reduced and competition between local governments is encouraged 
(Montinola, Qian, Weingast 1995). These decentralization processes have been attributed to 
lay a political basis for economic growth. In Vietnam, decentralization has predominantly 
occurred in form of delegation of administrative tasks whereby the degree heavily varies 
across the country. However, the relatively low educational level of local officials represents 
constraints to the effectiveness of decentralization (Fforde 2003). 
Development strategy 
In the initial phase, the first issue to be dealt with was agriculture since the current system at 
that time was highly unproductive and the vast majority of the population lived in rural areas. 
Then the focus shifted towards the industrial sector, aiming at expanding autonomy at firm-
level. Despite these similarities, major disparities led to slightly different situations. For 
instance, China entered the reform period with a more advantageous starting point in terms of 
macroeconomic conditions. Vietnam was listed as one of the poorest countries in the world 
and dealt with declining growth, hyperinflation, large budget deficits, and high dependence on 
foreign savings, food shortages, and deteriorating external circumstance. China had a low 
inflation and budget deficits, high savings, and low external debts, plus the industry was 
stronger than in Vietnam, where agriculture was the largest sector (Harvie, Tran 1997, p.192), 
Vu 2009).  
A general common feature the development strategy of China and Vietnam that distinguishes 
them from other transition economies, for instance Central Eastern European countries, is the 
devotion to gradualism. Whereas many former Soviet countries followed the policy 
recommendations of the World Bank and IMF and pursued a big bang approach characterized 
by rapid privatization and a focus on macroeconomic reforms, the leaders of China and 
Vietnam took a different path. Experts agree that it was exactly this incremental and 
experimental leadership style that was decisive for the subsequent emergence of an efficient 
market system.  
The government set out guidelines and objectives without specifying the exact steps to 
undertake, allowing economic actors to choose and influence institutions based on trial and 
error. As a consequence, bottom-up movements could evolve (Tran, Le, Nguyen 2008, Nee 
and Opper 2012, p.9), consisting of realignments of the different interests between the various 
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economic actors. Naturally, this led to a more market-driven economy. Another advantage 
was that formal institutions tend to follow ex post changes in the informal business sector, 
meaning that they were compliant to the needs of businessmen (Nee 2005, p. 61).  Vietnam’s 
reform period can be divided into two phases: The early period of reforms between 1986 and 
1989, and the transition to market economy between 1989 until the present (Harvie, Tran 
1997, p.48). In 1986, the Sixth national Congress defined liberalization and deregulation of 
the economy as the main goal, marking the start of a new era. Compared to decollectivization 
process in China, Vietnamese reforms appear more conservative, indicated by shorter land 
leases and limits on hectares per household (Karadjis 2005).  
Socialist countries such as China and Vietnam could only have succeeded economically under 
the condition that capitalistic measurement became accepted. King and Szelényi (2005, p.206) 
distinguish between three ways in which capitalism emerges within a communist system. The 
case of China and Vietnam is categorized as capitalism from below and, characterized by the 
bottom-up development of a private and hybrid sector, which the government has not directly 
anticipated. Moreover, the new market system relies strongly on domestic firms co-existing 
with large and powerful state-owned companies, whereby the manufacturing industry is the 
leading sector. Regarding the political structure, the former totalitarian regime has been 
partially liberalized, while patron-client relations are common practice (King and Szelényi 
2005, p.213). Capitalistic structures can therefore be regarded as an unintended by product 
that is necessary for the growth of the private sector. 
Market-supporting formal institutions 
An analysis of the political system in China and Vietnam reveals a difficult environment for 
private firms. Although reformist ideas have tremendous gained popularity, resistance within 
the party is still apparent. In order to demonstrate more clearly the hostile environment private 
entrepreneurs have to face in those countries indexes of international organizations are 
utilized. One suitable measurement of overall formal institutions is the Economic Freedom 
Index. It comprises various factors, property rights, corruption, and business freedom to 
examine four larger categories within a country: rule of law, limited government, regulatory 
efficiency, and open markets. A high index is associated with greater prosperity (The Heritage 
Foundation 2014).  
In general, China and Vietnam score relatively low. China’s score of 52.2 and the results for 
Vietnam of 50.8 are below world average and the countries are therefore classified as mostly 
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unfree. Breaking down this score into its individual indicators, one can see that the main 
issues for both countries lies in investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, and 
freedom from corruption, mostly the determinants of rule of law. Property rights that have 
been repeatedly singled out as a crucial formal institutions for growth by NIE is in fact the 
most troublesome factor with a score of 15 in Vietnam and 20 in China out of 100. In a world-
wide comparison of 178 countries, China therefore ranks as 137 and Vietnam as 147.  
 These governance weaknesses are also reflected by the Provincial Competitiveness Index 
(PCI) that measures the willingness and capacity of the provincial government to create a 
market-friendly environment for the private sector. Transparency is a key factor, ranging from 
information availability to active participation of private firms in policy decision making. 
Vietnam has been classified as a Level 1-country, meaning that it scores very low on the 
transparency scale and that there is a lack of dialogue between firms and government (The 
Asia Foundation 2011). According to conventional NIE theories, these weaknesses in formal 
institutions imply that the economy in China and Vietnam must be highly underdeveloped as 
well, but the opposite is the case. 
3.2. Private sector development 
The emergence of the private sector in China and Vietnam is chosen as the analytical focus 
because it perfectly illustrates the underestimated significance of informal institutions. In 
addition, it is the sector with the highest growth rate and entrepreneurs are considered to hold 
a pioneering position within society, highly influencing the reform process (Heberer 2003, 
p.3). Furthermore, the institutional environment is in a phase of rapid and dramatic change 
that is guided by the government as well as by bottom-up developments. Therefore it 
exemplifies an economic potential that can be unfolded by a favourable interplay between 
informal and formal institutions.  
The analysis of private sector development (PSD) is divided into four main sections. First of 
all, a general overview about the private firms in pre and post-reform China and Vietnam is 
given, comprising of the institutional environment, particularly the role of the government in 
influencing this sector. Secondly, the analysis takes a more in-depth and micro-level 
perspective by examining the Chinese and Vietnamese entrepreneur as the main actor within 
the institutional environment, taking into consideration the cultural and socioeconomic 
context. An essential component hereby is the utilization of informal institutions such as 
social networks to cope with business risks. After that, the economic phenomenon of regional 
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clusters is explained by giving concrete examples. Finally, a summary and cross-country 
comparison is provided, as well as backward linkage to the theoretical framework. 
3.2.1. Overview 
First of all, when analyzing the privatization strategy of China and Vietnam, the first step is to 
recognize that their policies gradually allowed the entrance of private firms. This stands in 
contrast with the tactic of privatizing the existing enterprises which was wide-spread among 
Central and Eastern European countries (van Arkadie 1995, p.276). In China and Vietnam, the 
initial trigger for bottom-up privatization development was wide-spread poverty in the 
country side (Heberer 2003, p.11). Complying with government set-out rules presented no 
prospect, increasing the incentive to decouple from these rules. Instead, a return to small 
family businesses was observable with the anticipation of better living standards. This 
practice became easier in areas where local governments tolerated those illegal activities, 
either out of self-interests or because they simply had no means to effectively stop them.  
Regarding the general political environment, the ruling party is dominated by communist 
ideology and will most likely stay in power. At the same time, the private sector has 
developed to become a powerful engine that vastly contributed to the economy’s wealth and 
has achieved a high-regarded status, both among the political leaders and the society. In the 
following, the various factors will be examined that have led to the strong growth of private 
businesses despite the lack of supporting institutions. Overstatement of the importance of 
formal institutions is common, backed up by the rapidly expanding number of private 
business after the introduction of economic reforms. Still, these numbers can be misleading.  
Several firm-level empirical studies have found extensive private business activities, mostly 
in the informal sector that could not be captured by official data. Based on these findings, the 
conclusion is made that informal institutions must play whereby the specific mechanisms 
need to be studied in more detail. 
China 
In China, the rapid development of a strong private sector was not anticipated by the 
government. In later reform phases, the state started to actively facilitate and promote private 
sector growth, but initially private businessmen operated in a semi-legal zone with basically 
no market-supporting institutions. In the 1980s, private firms were typically either registered 
as collectives or operating in the informal sector. The origins of many private firms in rural 
areas can be therefore be traced back to township and village enterprises (TVE), a 
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collectively-owned company that is run by the local government and managed 
collaboratively. Despite the emergence of different forms of TVEs, they all shared certain 
common characteristics. For instance, they were led by private entrepreneurs, but strongly 
intertwined with the local government and their ownership form was vaguely defined (Xu, 
Zhang 2009).  
During the initial transition phase that was characterized by high uncertainty and constant 
changing environment, these firms flourished due to their intrinsic nature. Being a hybrid 
form between private firms and state-owned firms, they featured characteristics that enabled 
them to take advantage of the transition phase. These hybrid firms were considered the source 
of prosperity for local governments in the 1980s (Nolan 1995, p. 248). Not only did these 
firms absorb the large labour surplus after the agricultural reforms, but they were a valuable 
source of income for the local government, making officials directly interested in their high 
performance. 
 Starting in the mid-1990s, the success of TVEs negatively correlated with the rise and 
recognition of private ownership. Still, many private firms were spin-offs from TVEs and they 
are still considered to have been the backbone of the emerging private sector. The existence of 
TVEs is a unique Chinese phenomenon that considerably contributed to a smooth transition. 
Riedel and Comer (1995) even argued that the reason why long-term growth in Vietnam is 
less remarkable compared to China because an equivalent hybrid form in Vietnam never 
existed (Harvie, Tran 1997). 
One of the most decisive periods for the private sector was the mid 1990s   when a new 
Company Law was introduced and China was officially acknowledged to be a socialist 
market economy. Since then, establishment of private companies have skyrocketed with a 
growth rate of 35 percent on average (ten Brink 2012). According to Nee and Lian (1994) one 
influential factor was the declining commitment to communist ideology (Smelser, Swedberg 
2005, p.61). As economic development became key priority of the government, ideology 
receded into the background. Still, even after the emergence of real private firms, the official 
policies treated them as an inferior company type to SOEs in the beginning (Lu 1994, p.123). 
This lack of acknowledgement did not prevent the private sector from growing. By the end of 
the 1980s, the private sector in Wenzhou accounted for at least 40 percent of GMP. The local 
economy was estimated to be coordinated to 80 percent by the free market. This resulted in 
rapidly rising standard of living. In 1989, the per capita money income of urban residents in 
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Wenzhou was 33.25 percent higher than the national averages, turning one of the poorest 
areas to a role model for economic prosperity (Lu 1995, p.126).  
In retrospect, private entrepreneurs can be attributed to be the pioneers of China’s economic 
reforms. In the 80s, the development process was characterized by reformist leaders and 
private entrepreneurs simultaneously urging for institutional change that would facilitate 
growth. Although at the beginning, the small-scale business activities within the private sector 
were condemned by the government, approval grew with their success rates. In the end, the 
government realized the potential and pragmatically responded with market-supporting 
institutional adjustments (Lu 1995, p.126). The political perception of private sector went 
from antagonistic to supplementary until it was officially referred to as an important 
constituent of the economy in 1999 (Heberer 2003, p.19).  
Vietnam  
According to a study in Northern Vietnam, spontaneous privatization processes already 
occurred in the 1960s, long before the economic reforms, mostly consisting of small family 
businesses that produced basic commodities (Heberer 2003, p.15). According to a study, 
SMEs accelerate the industrialization process, provide employment and income, and support 
large enterprises, making it a dynamic and valuable source of economic growth. Still, SMEs 
are in a disadvantageous position due to their lack of high technological capacities and high-
educated workers, and their struggling with business expansion. Similarly to the Chinese case, 
private entrepreneurs in Vietnam faced a hostile business environment due to the socialist 
legacy. In 1995, private firms in Vietnam were found to produce only 7.5 percent of the GDP.  
 
The private sector was highly underdeveloped which was problematic since the rapidly 
growing labour force could not be absorbed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The state 
recognized this problem and implemented various policies in mid 1990s to counteract these 
issues, consisting of modifying the regulatory framework of private enterprises (Hakkala, 
Kokko 2005). However, SOE were still regarded as the leading sector that enjoyed a high 
status among politicians, meaning that they received preferential treatment regarding credit 
access. In Vietnam, economic liberalization throughout the 1980s did not include the support 
of the private sector. Only in 1988, an official law was introduced (van Arkadie 1995, p.277). 
A major breakthrough for private enterprises in Vietnam was the promulgation of the 
Enterprise Law in 2000 (Tran, Le, Nguyen 2008) which significantly simplified the 
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establishment of private firms by abandoning administrative difficulties. This led to an 
immediate extreme increase of registered private firms.  
The sheer number of apparently new firms indicates that a high proportion has existed before 
as unregistered household businesses operating in the informal sector, a suspicion that has 
been confirmed by studies conducted by the World Bank (Pham 1999). Although 95 percent 
of the private firms are SMEs, the terms were not officially defined until November 2001, 
indicating that their importance was recognized at a very late stage. The case of Vietnam is 
particularly interesting because it contradicts with the assumption that an efficient legal 
system and property rights are a prerequisite for economic growth. The Vietnamese economy, 
partially driven by private firms, has flourished in almost complete absence of formal 
institutions, representing an even more extreme case than China (van Arkadie 1995, p.262). 
The importance of the private small and medium-sized companies has long been recognized 
by academics (Tran, Le, Nguyen 2008). They have been found to contribute 39 percent to the 
GDP in 2006 and 85 percent of the total workforce of enterprises in 2004 (Sakata 2010).   
 
Furthermore, their contribution of the national budget was higher than that of foreign-invested 
enterprises in 2002, namely 7.4 percent compared to 6 percent (Nguyen 2007, p.305). 
However, their development path has been undergone in the presence of enormous constraints 
and challenges. One major issue is the lack of finance. Obtaining bank loans is extremely 
difficult for private firms. Firstly, they appear unattractive for the banks because of their small 
size. More importantly, they face discrimination because of their ownership status. SOEs are 
the less risky choice in giving out loans since they are backed up by the government and will 
therefore almost never face bankruptcy. Another survey conducted in 1991, covering 923 
urban enterprises confirms that a vast number of private urban enterprises have existed long 
before the introduction of the doi moi reform. Approximately 60 percent were established 
before 1988 (Ronnas, Ramamurthy 2001, p.7). After the introduction of more liberalized 
reforms in 1986, there was a sudden increase of private entrepreneurial activities by 21 
percent (Ronnas, Ramathurthy 2001, p.59).  
It was not until the year of 2000 that the importance of small firms and the private sector as a 
valuable source of employment and income was formally recognized by the government, 
indicated by several key documents (Ronnas, Ramamurthy 2001, p.2-3). The growing 
numbers of entrepreneurs does not necessarily imply that they have been supported by the 
institutional environment. On the contrary, basic necessities for an entrepreneur such as credit 
access, market information etc. were extremely difficult to acquire. The research showed that 
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own savings and borrowing from friends and family made up over 95 percent of the invested 
capital for household and private enterprises, suggesting that the financial market was highly 
underdeveloped (Ronnas, Ramamurthy 2001, p.7).  
Other than capital shortage as a main problem, entrepreneurs face challenges because of the 
lack of distribution channels and physical infrastructure (Ronnas, Ramamurthy 2001, p.10). 
Surprisingly, the surveyed small businesses maintain a strongly reluctant attitude towards 
government support. In Ho-Chi-Minh City, 76 percent declare that they do not wish for any 
kind of direct government assistance, with “premises” and infrastructure being the exception 
(Ronnas, Ramamurthy 2001, p.56). This position indicates that business prefer to rely on 
other measures. The economic reforms have vastly facilitated the establishment and running 
of private businesses. Nevertheless, private enterprises, especially in the industrial sector, still 
face many internal and external challenges. Still, the government has only recently begun to 
actively promote the private sector, meaning that the full potential has not been realized yet 
(Schaumburg-Müller 2005). 
Comparison  
Chinese private sector grew at a more rapid speed than Vietnam. Also, private firms in China 
are more closely linked to the state sector than Vietnamese firms (Heberer 2003, p.282). 
According to studies conducted by various international organizations such as World Bank, 
United Nations Development, and the Asian Development Bank, the atmosphere for 
Vietnamese private firms has been referred to as grudging rather than supportive, in contrast 
to the Chinese case in which the sector has been acknowledged a key role (Karadjis 2005). In 
both countries, private business activities were carried out small-scale in the informal sector 
in the beginning, while formal institutions were completely absent. Exclusively relying on 
official statistics to capture the emergence of private firms does not show the whole picture 
since no reliable data exists about informal business activities. However, different studies 
suggest that the bottom-up development of the private sector has taken place long before it 
was recognized by the state. Only with continuous success that noticeably brought prosperity 
to the local government and the region, the private sector slowly gained political legitimacy 
and external support, but the process was long, full of challenges, and still incomplete.  
Although official recognition tremendously facilitated private business activities, the 
institutional environment was still far from ideal. Basic formal institutions such as an efficient 
property rights and generally a trustworthy legal system are missing whereby China has 
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achieved a more developed stage compared to Vietnam. Additionally, private entrepreneurs 
still face severe discrimination regarding access to bank loans that signified the preferential 
status of SOEs. In order to overcome these obstacles, private entrepreneurs relied on informal 
institutions that will be further explored in the following sections. 
3.2.2. Entrepreneurship in China and Vietnam 
In order to understand the economic phenomenon one has to study the social player within the 
private sector, namely the entrepreneur. Despite the extensive studies about entrepreneurship, 
few attempts were made to incorporate informal institutions such as the cultural dimension 
into the models. Vuong and Tran (2009) have studied private entrepreneurship in Vietnam 
under special consideration of the cultural and socioeconomic environment. As typical for a 
country highly influenced by socialist ideas, private businesses were deeply discouraged until 
the early 1990s. Between 1988 and 1991, private entrepreneurs became target of political 
assault led by conservative within the party (Nee, Opper 2012). Not only did the government 
oppose their activities, but also a social stigma is a powerful impediment. Entering the 
business world was associated with low status within society, no security and future. Only 
after the positive effects of private enterprises became visible such as employment creation, 
tolerance, acceptance, and support grew among the society. Social perception often derives 
from cultural beliefs. For instance, the social ranking called Si-Nong-Cong-Thuong is an old 
saying whose origins can be traced back to the Chinese version of Shi-Nong-Gong-Shan, and 
which is still present in people’s mind (Vuong, Tran 2009). In this ranking, merchants and 
entrepreneurs are traditionally in the lowest ranking. Although nowadays, few people would 
agree to this negative association, it illustrates how difficult the emergence of private 
entrepreneurship was, given the cultural and social settings. Keeping in mind the complete 
absence of formal institutions, the emergence of a relatively strong private sector is therefore 
an obscurity.  
McMillan and Woodruff (2002) have studied entrepreneurial patterns in transition economies, 
inter alia, in China and Vietnam. An extensive survey highlights the impediments faced by 
many entrepreneurs. The difficulties start with the establishment of the company, including 
acquisition of a business license, registration, tax regulations. In Vietnam, the time required to 
set up a new business has been found to be approximately six months. Furthermore, the costs 
associated such as payment of official fees amount to 150 percent of per capita GDP.  
Additionally to direct impediments posed by the local government, the lack of efficient formal 
institutions pose an obstacle to the development of private firms. Market institutions in 
24 
 
Vietnam were still found to be insufficient after a decade of reform. For instance, private 
companies were still heavily discriminated regarding access to bank loans and the court 
system was inefficient. In a survey conducted between 1995 and 1997, less than 10 percent 
said that courts could enforce contracts, and also 10 percent stated that they succeeded in 
accessing credit from banks. Studies have shown that in order to cope with this uncertain 
environment, private entrepreneurs develop self-help mechanisms to substitute for 
conventional market-supporting institutions.  
Informal institutions 
One important instrument is the development of personalized relations to business partners. 
Due to the weak legal system, trusts in the enforcement of contracts rights were replaced by 
trust based on long-term trading relations (McMillan, Woodruff 1999). A survey between 
1995 and 1997 of 259 non-state firms regarding relational contracting has dealt with the 
question on what ground this level of trust is based on. A simple and common situation is 
when a supplier consents to payment after his customer has delivered his products, meaning 
that he provides his good in advance. His confidence on the honest repayment of his customer 
is based on the conviction that his customer wishes to maintain a business relationship in the 
future, giving him an incentive to comply with the informal agreement (McMillan, Woodruff 
1999). Various factors increase the probability of this ideal situation. For instance, the more 
information is gathered through regular inspection and visit, and the longer the duration of the 
relationship, the higher is the level of trust. Additionally, the incentive to repay debt is 
especially strong when it is difficult to find an alternative supplier due to high transaction 
costs. The lack of alternative trading partners seems to be an influential factor. A company in 
close proximity of competitors have been found to grant 15 percent point less credit. 
Furthermore, belonging to a network is a decisive factor, adding 10-20 percent point more 
credit. Within a network, it is easier to acquire information about a business partner, plus the 
opportunity for community sanctions is enhanced. This gives the supplier a certain power and 
therefore motivates a supplier to take more risks and give more trade credit. According to 
official statistics, private entrepreneurship in the industrial sector contributed to 24.6 percent 
in 2000, increased to 37 percent in 2005. Since a part of small-scale private business activities 
take place in the informal sector, economists argue that their real contribution is de facto even 
higher. 
Entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam have operated under immensely difficult circumstances. 
Informal institutions have served as a viable alternative for the lack of formal institutions. 
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Relational contracting based on trust and repeated business interaction substituted for an 
efficient contract law, business disputes were handled personally so that a court system was 
not utilized. The incentive structure that encourages collaborative and honest business 
behaviour and discourages opportunism was stabilized through the development of close-knit 
community members in which gossip and community sanctions was a powerful tool. 
Nonetheless, according to many academics, these informal mechanisms rapidly reached its 
limitations since. Therefore, they only explain how private business activity was possible but 
not the extent to which it has gained importance within the national economy.  In order to 
understand how these small-scale entrepreneurial activities that mainly produced simple 
products have become such a valuable and indispensable sector. One of the key challenges for 
entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam were the stigmatization of being an exploiter and 
capitalist. When it comes to informal institutions, Chinese and Vietnamese entrepreneurs 
relied on very similar social mechanisms such as relational contracting, network building, and 
trust-based collaboration. 
3.2.3. Case study: Private firms in HCMC 
In order to determine a trend in PSD in Vietnam and to compare it with previous research 
about the business environment of private entrepreneurs, a survey is conducted among private 
firms in HCMC. Fifteen managers were surveyed in total.  Due to the extremely small sample 
size, the survey is neither representative, nor can be empirical evidence drained out of the 
results. However, it reflects the perspective of businessmen in HCMC and gives and overview 
how their business environment looks like. Since it is a non-representative survey, the 
approach is reverse to regular analysis. Instead of drawing conclusion from the results, 
expected results are formulated beforehand based on previous research analysis which in 
essence. According to previous research by McMillan and Woodruff, private businessmen in 
Vietnam operate within an antagonistic framework. Trust in law enforcement is weak and the 
bureaucratic burdens are high. Therefore, I expect the survey results to paint a similar picture.  
Contrary to expectations, 10 out of 15 firms obtained a bank credit to finance their business 
operations, with trade credit provided by suppliers being the second most frequently chosen 
answer. Additionally, the respondents were asked to rank the factors that influence their 
decision to choose a new supplier. The majority has stated quality, price, and supply time of 
the products as the most influential factor. Based on previous studies, the most influential 
factor would have been expected to be recommendation by friends. One of the most 
unanticipated results was the trust in the legal system. The result of 6.8 is a rather high value 
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particularly taking in consideration the bad reputation of the Vietnamese legal system. 40 per 
cent rated an 8. This might show a trend that the legal system has made improvement 
regarding law enforcement.  
However, many results comply with the assumptions about Vietnamese business practices. 
For instance, two thirds of the surveyed managers stated that they typically find their suppliers 
through personal connections, which is the most frequent answer, closely followed by 
recommendation of friends with 58.33%. This emphasizes the importance of personalized 
networking in finding business partners. Also, it appears highly possible for firms to find out 
in case they have been deceived by their suppliers (6.5) which indicate that they have 
relatively effective means to gain information about other firms within their network. 
 Another result that is compliant with the analysis is the methods used to handle business 
disputes with suppliers whereby several answers were possible. A vast majority of over 80 per 
cent prefers to negotiate and find a solution between the two parties involved while only one 
respondent would choose to go to courts or file a lawsuit. This illustrates the preference for 
informal problem solutions. However, half of the interviewees also seek advice from local 
authorities, indicating that they are not completely excluded from the private business world.  
The results are slightly different when asking about disputes with customers. In this case 
solutions are almost exclusively worked out between the two parties. When it comes to 
finding customers, targeted advertisement is the most common method, closely followed by 
personal connections and recommendations. On average, the respondents know approximately 
65 per cent of their customers, stressing the importance of personalized relationships.  
Government agencies are found to be of little assistance in establishing the business. One 
quarter stated that they were not helpful at all, indicated that active promotion by the side of 
local officials is not common. A very interesting aspect is also how firms describe their 
relationship to the government. Half portrayed the relationship as friendly and mutually 
beneficial, one third answered that it is characterized by indifference and about 16 per cent 
prefer to avoid any contact with the government due to predatory behaviour. This indicates 
that the government attitude is mostly tolerating but it is difficult to draw any reasonable 
conclusions. The difficulty of starting a new business has been rated as a 4.6 which is not as 
low as expected. Taking a closer look at the specific obstacles there is a wide and fairly 
evenly distributed range of difficulties indicating that entrepreneurs face various kinds of 
challenges. Taking the average, the extent of connections to the government as well as 
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connections to friends and family members on benefiting the business has been rated with the 
same value (6.5).  
In summary, the survey results do not entirely confirm the expectations. The reliance on 
personalized relationship is slightly weaker than anticipated whereas the government plays a 
more significant, and more importantly, more positive role. Although it is problematic to 
interpret the results due to the small number of surveyed people, it might point towards a 
small progress concerning government support and legal system. A similar study covering 
more firms throughout the whole country 
3.2.4. Regional clusters 
In the past two decades, industrial clusters centred around private entrepreneurs and 
coordinated by local governments have mushroomed in rural areas. These clusters 
endogenously developed through the extensive imitation of successful business ideas, leading 
to a dense network of firms which often manufactured the same products. There are three 
distinct types of industrial districts in China: The Wenzhou model, the Sunan Model and the 
Pearl River Delta Model (PRD), each one following a different development path. When 
analyzing regional clusters in Vietnam, three industries are of particular importance: 
garments, consumer electronics, and motor vehicles (Sakata 210). They were focus in the 
cluster study by McCarty et al (2005), plus were selected as priority industries, receiving extra 
support. 
Wenzhou Model  
Some scholars argue that the rise of China was essentially led by private business activities 
that primarily took place in selected localities. One of the most prominent examples of 
regional clusters in China started as small family-owned business in Wenzhou, Zhejiang 
province which is nowadays considered as the pioneer of PSD (Wei, Li, Wang 2007). 
Wenzhou’s initial conditions appear far from ideal for economic growth. It was an extremely 
poor area. The low rate of government investment proved to become an advantage by leading 
to less SOE orientation and therefore allowing marketization more easily and openly.  Private 
businesses were often established as a last resort since there were few prospects to gain 
income, mostly operated in the informal sector or were registered as TVEs. In the beginning 
of reforms, entrepreneurs in Wenzhou struggled with many obstacles. Not only were basic 
resources missing such as technology, market information, infrastructure, and financial 
capital, but they became the target of state suppression. Therefore, entrepreneurs relied on 
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their local networks to provide them with basic necessities such as small loans and 
information.  In the beginning, the attitude of the local government towards these semi-legal 
activities ranged from indifference to tolerance and even support, simply because they 
welcomed any kind tax revenue. The success of private businesses is also attributed to their 
business culture that praises mercantilism and encourages entrepreneurial spirit.  
The industrial district in Wenzhou has undergone a restructuring process since 1980s. 
Formerly centred on small family businesses, the industry is now dominated by larger firms 
and MREs with “networks extending nationally and globally”. Wenzhou has become a role 
model for other poor areas and remains a symbol of … but the sustainability of this model has 
been questioned recently. In 2002 and 2003, the growth rates have become lower than the 
provincial average. One of the main struggles is the custom of sticking to labour-intensive, 
simple products instead of moving up the technological ladder. The strength of the Wenzhou 
model, namely running business based on trustworthy social networks, becomes a weakness 
when trying to maintain their competitiveness and integrate into the globalizing economy. The 
local networks consist of strong, personalized bonds between various trade partners, making it 
difficult for outsiders to join and to extend business (Wei, Li, Wang 2007). 
However, it is a prime example for a flourishing bottom-up development whose enormous 
success quickly spread around the country, inspiring other regions to drive for prosperity by 
following the Wenzhou model. 
 
Garment industry in Ho Chi Minh-City 
One specific case in Vietnam that accurately exemplified the importance of informal 
institutions for the economy is the garment industry in Ho Chi Minh-City. In HCMC, the 
private sector is the biggest contributor. There were 1,399 non-state enterprises, comprising 
57% of the total garment industry in Vietnam in HCMC and the souring area (Sakata 2010). 
Within this sector informal subcontracting between a large supplier and micro-level 
subcontractors play a major role. The following results are based on a field work in 2002-
2004, as well as in the year 2009. Despite the small sample size of 21 suppliers, this research 
offers valuable insights due to its in-depth data and information collection, focusing on 
personal relationship with their business partners.  
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The findings suggest that the due to the informal nature of business affiliation, the relationship 
often extends to a financial relationship. Subcontractors are typically dependent on their 
original contractors’ credits and loans as a financial source (Goto 2013). The study concludes 
that the personalized linkages and high reliance on informal institutions is an overall positive 
contribution. They benefit original contractors with low processing fee payments and thus 
high profits, plus provide subcontractors with essential loans that they could not have 
obtained otherwise. The fact that some original contractors have started as subcontractors and 
evolved throughout time indicates a virtuous circle that significantly facilitates the entrance of 
private entrepreneurs in complete absence of market-supporting formal institutions. The 
garment industry is also an interesting example because it has been found to have the greatest 
tendency to cluster in Vietnam (Sakata 2010). This case contains valuable lessons. Almost all 
subcontractors and micro firms that are an essential contributor to the local economy are not 
registered, meaning that conclusion solely based on official statistics may convey an 
incomplete picture. 
Comparison 
Industrial clusters have emerged in both countries. Both the Chinese and Vietnamese PSD 
originally started small-scale in poorer areas with little to no supportive institutions. An 
important feature in China which is missing in Vietnam is the emergence of a hybrid type 
ownership, the TVEs that have facilitated a smooth transition to a market economy. 
Otherwise, there are many similarities observable, from the early struggles against predatory 
behaviour of the government up until the reliance on kinship based close-knit communities for 
survival. Still, the private sector as it is today differs from one another. There is a great 
qualitative difference. The Chinese regional clusters have successfully integrated into the 
value chain, exporting their products to the global market. In contrast, the wide-spread 
practice of subcontracting in Vietnam may eventually produce export goods in the end, but it 
appears less organized. Furthermore, the formal institutions stressed by NIE such as property 
rights are further developed in China. The more sophisticated stage of the private sector in 
China can surely be attributed to the supportive attitude of the local government. Even after 
TVEs declines and purely private firms emerged, local officials remained involved as a 
legacy. Conversely, Vietnamese private entrepreneurs did not enjoy the same support of the 
local government. The divergence of the private sector growth indicates that formal 
institutions are necessary in the long-run. 
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There are valuable lessons that can be drawn from the PSD in China and Vietnam. First of all, 
the studies of information institutions are vastly underrepresented in conventional economics. 
Although NIE acknowledges the importance of informal institutions, the theories remain 
rather superficial and broad, sophisticated models and resulting policy recommendations are 
missing. An incomplete understanding of the specific mechanisms of informal institutions and 
their development will improve the quality of policy recommendations for developing 
countries that are suffering from ineffective formal institutions. 
What government can do to maximize the full potential of industrial clusters based on 
informal networking is the provision of infrastructure leading to urban markets. Another issue 
is the weak linkage between small and medium-sized enterprises and state-owned enterprises, 
as well as large multinational corporations that prevents important FDI spill over effects on 
the local economy. Since they mainly operate on the domestic market they certainly 
strengthen domestic capabilities. But in order to further grow and penetrate more 
sophisticated sector, the domestic firms must develop strong absorptive capacities. 
Informal institutions have defined every aspect of the private sector development, particularly 
in the early stages. One of the most crucial institutional changes in the long-run was the 
declining stigma of private entrepreneurs and the simultaneous rise of social recognition.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
First of all, an accurate assessment of PSD in China and Vietnam represents a major 
challenge. Official statistics are often highly unreliable, particularly in earlier periods. 
Moreover, private firms have often registered under another classification to avoid 
discrimination which further blurs the actual picture. Another issue is the regional disparities 
within the country, for instance is the difference between Northern and Southern Vietnam 
immense. Additionally, another difficulty with the topic in general is the fairly recent growth 
of the private sector. The long-term development need to be assessed in the future. According 
to the before mentioned theories about the interaction between formal and informal 
institutions, a misalignment of interest between the members of the society and the state poses 
a major problem. This divergence definitely existed when examining the private sector in a 
communist society which is the case in both China and Vietnam. The actual development 
mostly took place before the accompanying policies were introduced, making policy 
recommendations difficult. The most important information to keep in mind regarding the 
private sector in China and Vietnam is that in the beginning they developed in complete 
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absence of market-supporting formal institutions and were even discriminated against by the 
government and society. Nonetheless, private entrepreneurs have developed informal 
institutions to reduce risks and they have led to the emergence of important regional clusters 
and developed into a major engine for the economy. By continuously relying on informal 
institutions such as social networking, relational contracting, informal trade credit, they have 
continued to grow and slowly won social recognition and political legitimacy, changing the 
institutional environment in their favor.  
Effective rule enforcement can surely benefit business operations. Still, important to note is 
that the early development of private business activities would have not been possible without 
the rather ineffective enforcement and lax monitoring. This emphasizes the strength of the 
government’s experimental approach in which laws leaves room for interpretation. 
Paradoxically, this lenient approach to laws can develop into a great issue in the future when 
efficient formal institutions are needed to protect entrepreneurs’ rights.  
From the institutional perspective, the PSD in China and Vietnam is an interesting case. 
Clearly, it is a bottom up development that has emerged rather spontaneously, driven by 
private entrepreneurs. Neither the government nor any other higher authority played a 
significant role in the beginning, but only reacted after the process has taken place. In 
retrospect the reaction was favourable in the long-run although Chinese local governments 
appear to be more involved and intertwined with the small businesses compared to Vietnam.  
Determining the right institutions are one of the most problematic challenges. The academic 
community widely agrees that efficient formal institutions are necessary in the long-run. Both 
China and Vietnam have made serious efforts in modifying their legal framework and upgrade 
their systems to international standards. However, enforcement issues remain, particularly in 
Vietnam. Wide-spread corruption is common practice and trust in the legal system is weak. 
The analysis of the PSD reveals how insufficient the theories of NIE are in providing an 
understanding of bottom-up developments. Although NIE provides a fairly realistic and 
profound basis for explaining economic development, it is indeed still in an infant stage and 
needs additionally modifications and extensions. The main critic point refers to the 
overemphasis of formal institutions in the literature, while the complexity of informal 
institutions is only superficially touched. Particularly when dealing with transition and 
developing economies with imperfect formal institutions, this mistake can be fatal. 
Furthermore, since policy recommendations typically refer to formal institutions, the 
decision-makers need to take into consideration the specific context, just as Rodrik and North 
32 
 
have emphasized. Formal institutions that are not compliant with the existing informal 
institutions are highly unlikely to be effective and sustainable. 
The analysis of the private sector development in China and Vietnam reveals that it has 
emerged in virtual absence of formal institutions. The explanation why the private sector 
growth was possible in the first place can be traced back to informal institutions that have 
served as a practicable substitute. Private entrepreneurs have overcome severe obstacles by 
establishing close-knit social networks in which sanctioning and reward mechanisms 
efficiently worked. 
Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that conventional economic theory such as New 
Institutional Economics prove to be insufficient in explaining the phenomenon. Instead, 
elements of Economic Sociology, that put a stronger emphasis on social relations between 
individual actors, offer a more adequate explanation for the power of informal institutions. In 
conclusion, this study field is recommended to be fully integrated into economic models. 
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6. Appendix 
Survey 
1. Please State your full name. 
_________________________ 
2. What is your job position? 
o self-employed 
o CEO 
o General Manager 
o Middle Manager 
o Clerk 
o Other: ___________ 
3. What is the firm’s ownership type? 
o State ownership 
o Common Ownership 
o Private ownership 
o ownership by political organization 
o Other: ________________ 
4. How many employees does the firm approximately have? 
o 1-7 
o 8-20 
o 21-50 
o 51-20 
o 200+ 
5. What city is the firm located in? 
____________________________ 
6. What is the firm’s industry type? (Several answers possible) 
o Agricultural Products 
o Manufacturing 
o Retail 
o Service  
o Finance 
o Other: _________________ 
7. What year was the firm established? 
_________________________________ 
8. How are the business operations mainly financed? (Several answers possible) 
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o Bank credit 
o Trade credit 
o Informal credit 
o Own savings 
o Other:______________________ 
9. Where is your major market? (Several answers possible) 
o within the city 
o within the province 
o within Vietnam 
o Overseas 
10. How do you usually find suppliers? (Several answers possible) 
o Targeted advertisement 
o Online search 
o Government support 
o Personal connections 
o Recommendation of friends 
o Other:__________________ 
11. Please guess between 1-10: If your supplier deceives another firm, how high is the 
probability of you finding out? (1 being “very low” and 10 being “very high”) 
____________________________ 
12. Which factor influences your decision of choosing a new supplier? (1 being “most 
important” and 10 being “least important”) 
 Own experience 
 Good reputation according to my business partners 
 Good reputation according to my friends and family members 
 Quality, price, and supply time of the product 
13. How does the firm typically handle business disputes? (Several answers possible) 
o We never have disputes 
o Ignore disputes 
o Negotiate and find a solution between you two 
o Seek advice from local authorities 
o Go to court/ file lawsuit 
o Other:___________ 
14. How do you usually find customers? (Several answers possible) 
o Targeted advertisement 
o Online search 
o Government support 
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o Personal connections 
o Recommendation of friends 
o Other:__________________ 
15. Please guess and state in percentage %: How many customers to you know in person? 
________________________________ 
16. How does the firm typically handle disputes with customers? (Several answers possible) 
o We never have disputes 
o Ignore disputes 
o Negotiate and find a solution between you two 
o Seek advice from local authorities 
o Go to court/ file lawsuit 
o Other:___________ 
17. Please rate between 1-10: To what extent did government agencies or government 
officials assist in establishing the business? (1 means “not helpful at all and 10 means “very 
helpful”) 
_______________________ 
18. How would you describe the firm’s relationship to the government? 
o friendly and mutually beneficial relationship 
o predatory behavior of the government, thus prefer to avoid them 
o no/ indifferent relationship 
o Other:________ 
19. Please rate between 1-10: How difficult is it to start a business in general? (1 means “very 
easy” and 10 means “very difficult”) 
__________________________ 
20. Please rank the obstacles to business establishment according to their level of difficulty (1 
is the biggest obstacles, 7 is a minor obstacles) 
 license acquisition 
 credit access 
 lack of technology 
 lack of human capital 
 lack of market information 
 lack of financial capital 
 other administrative problem 
21. Please name other obstacles if they had not been mentioned before! (optional) 
_______________________ 
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22. How would you rate the importance of personal connections to government officials in 
order to successfully doing business? (1 means "not important", 10 means "extremely 
important") 
___________________ 
23. To what extent do your personal connections to friends, family members, and 
acquaintances benefit your business? (1 means "not beneficial at all", 10 means "very 
beneficial") 
____________________ 
24.  How much do you trust in the legal system to enforce your rights in case of contract 
violation or other business disputes? (1 means "no trust at all", 10 means "very high trust") 
___________________________ 
25. What is your most important asset? Please rank them! (1 is “most important” and 5 is 
“least important”) 
 technology 
 human capital 
 government connections 
 reputation 
 personal connections 
26. Please name other important assets if they have not been mentioned before! (optional) 
_____________________ 
 
27. Any further comments? (optional) 
______________________________ 
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